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COMMENT 
A BIT Unfair?: An Illustration of the 
Backlash Against International 
Arbitration in Latin America 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have governed regulation of foreign in-
vestments made by U.S. investors for over thirty years now, but recently these 
treaties have generated much controversy.  With allegations that BITs terribly 
disadvantage developing third-world countries, at the profit of Western economic 
giants such as the United States, a recent rash of BIT withdrawals has swept 
through Latin America.1  Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Ecua-
dor have all disavowed BITs in the last four years.2  The Ecuadorian Constitution 
has even added prohibitions against resolving disputes through international arbi-
tration, a manner in which BITs regulate foreign investment disputes.3  These 
recent developments have compelled commentators to declare that the BIT regime 
is in a current “legitimacy crisis,” with its very existence in peril.4   
With the survival of BITs at fulcrum, the Second Circuit recently decided a 
highly publicized and notorious case applying international arbitration in Chevron 
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador.5  This comment will discuss Chevron and its effects 
within the wider corpus of BIT international arbitration to provide an illustration 
of the current debate and status of the BIT framework.  The purported benefits 
BITs provide to signatory countries exist theoretically, and to test these theoretical 
underpinnings, this comment will discuss Chevron for the purpose of providing 
real context to a predominately academic debate.  Chevron shall demonstrate that 
theoretical effects and practical effects are not equivalent and, possibly, why the 
current crisis in BIT arbitration exists.  This comment takes the position that, de-
spite the great potential of BITs, the continued survival of the BIT regime depends 
on evenhanded and fair judicial application, considerations ignored in Chevron. 
 ___________________________  
 1. See United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Recent Developments in International 
Investment Agreements (2008- June 2009), IIA Monitor No. 3, 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf; see also Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: 
How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 491, 491-93 (2009). 
 2. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 492.  
 3. Id. at n.9. 
 4. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1583 (2005). 
 5. 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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II. HISTORY 
A. Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) rose to prominence largely due to “un-
compensated expropriation” of foreign investments by developing countries.6  The 
end of World War II transitioned the world into a second phase of decolonization.7  
With fledgling states grasping for sovereign control over populaces and resources, 
international investment law originated from the influx of developing nations.8  At 
the very onset, a tension existed between developed and developing states.9  While 
Europe and the U.S. insisted on international standards for foreign investment 
regulation, the Third World—led by Latin America—insisted that countries 
should govern foreign investments by domestic standards.10  With disagreements 
across the world, countries began codifying foreign investment agreements 
through BITs.11  Since then, BITs have significantly molded the economic and 
legal architecture in the regulation of international investments. 
In 1959, Germany signed the first BIT.12  Having lost all of its foreign in-
vestments in World War II, Germany was particularly sensitive to the political 
risks of foreign investments.13  In the following decade, several European coun-
tries followed Germany’s lead by signing BIT agreements with various develop-
ing countries.14  However, despite the existence of these early BITs, the 1970s 
marked a time of unsettled international investment regulation.15  For example, in 
the early 1970s, the United Nations officially adopted a policy supporting expro-
priation without compensation.16  The U.N.’s Declaration of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) essentially permitted sovereigns to seize foreign private 
investments at will.17  Even when the United Nations promoted compensation for 
public takings, industrialized countries remained dissatisfied.18  In 1974, the Unit-
ed Nations adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(CERDS).19  The CERDS required sovereigns, when taking control of private 
investments, to compensate private investors with the fair market value for in-
vestments seized.20  However, under the CERDS, national law, not international 
 ___________________________  
 6. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 169 (2005).  The governments of these developing countries would often 
seize private investments and claim them as their own. 
 7. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 499. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 500. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 169. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 501. 
 16. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 167.   
 17. Id.  The United Nations adopted the NIEO, which favored developing countries, because, at the 
time, developing countries possessed the numerical majority in the U.N General Assembly. 
 18. Id. at 168.   
 19. Id. at 167-68. 
 20. Id. 
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law, determined the amount of compensation paid by the sovereign to private 
investors.21  In some cases, national law would not permit any compensation.22   
In the backdrop of the U.N.’s effort, European countries continued signing 
BIT agreements with developing countries.23  Paradoxically, these signatory de-
veloping countries insisted upon the NIEO and the CERDS, while disavowing the 
terms of their BIT agreements.24  During this time, the confluence of the policies 
adopted by the U.N. and individually negotiated BITs created an unsettled legal 
terrain, unpredictable to U.S. investors.25  U.S. investors simply lacked clear 
guidelines and rules of law in which to operate.26  With the sanctity of cross-
border contractual and property rights threatened, the United States required a 
consistent framework for managing foreign investments.27  BITs provided the U.S. 
with such a mechanism, and as a result, helped stabilize the international invest-
ment market.28   
In 1977, the United States officially adopted the BIT program and devoted the 
next four years to crafting a model negotiating text.29  Finished in 1981, this mod-
el text underwent numerous revisions in the following decade.30   However, adop-
tion of the BITs as the standard foreign investment agreement provided a uniform 
method for regulating foreign investments after 1982.31   Furthermore, develop-
ment of the model text allowed the U.S. to draft more cohesive and consistent BIT 
agreements.32  With adoptions of BITs and the creation of a model text, U.S. in-
vestors had a more definitive conceptualization of the legal contours in which they 
invested, insuring greater security of domestic capital abroad.33   
As mentioned previously, high political risk in developing countries placed 
the state of domestic securities abroad in jeopardy following World War II.34  
BITs reduce this risk in two ways.  First, disagreements existed over standards of 
law to apply, and BITs address this concern by consistently applying international 
standards of law, rather than the domestic law of the host nation.35  Second, BITs, 
by permitting international arbitration, also further investment protection by 
providing a mechanism for investors to enforce their rights.36 
 ___________________________  
 21. Id. at 168. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 168; Kaushal, supra note 1, at 501.  
 24. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 502.  See also Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 169. 
 25. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 501-02. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Joshua Robbins, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 438 (2006); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, 
U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 621, 628 (1993). 
 28. Vandevelde, supra note 27, at 628. 
 29. Id. at 624. 
 30. Id. at 627. 
 31. Id. at 627-28.  From 1982 to 1986, represents the first wave of BITS the U.S. signed.  During 
this time, the U.S. installed BIT agreements with Panama, Egypt, Morocco, Zaire, Cameroon, Bangla-
desh, Senegal, Haiti, Turkey, and Grenada.  Id. 
 32. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 170. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 177-78. 
 35. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 76 (2005); Alex R. Johnson, 
Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa, 59 EMORY L. J. 919, 925 (2010). 
 36. Johnson, supra note 35, at 925. 
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Coinciding with the United States’ adoption of BITs in the early 1980s, inter-
national economics were changing.37  Developing countries began shedding their 
healthy skepticism towards foreign investments.38  This development was rooted 
in two main causes.39  First, economic ideology began liberalizing international-
ly.40  Second, capital became scarce due to an international lending shortage.41  
Global economic liberalization,42 along with a private lending drought, exerted 
substantial pressure on developing countries to enter into BIT agreements.43  In 
time, developing countries would not only permit BITs, but also compete with 
other developing countries to sign such treaties.44  The need for consistent regula-
tion and a global economic shift in philosophy caused an international explosion 
of BIT agreements signed in the late 1980s.45  However, while establishing clear 
standards and guidelines created more legal certainty, BITs could not fully combat 
the fear of expropriation without a mechanism to enforce investor rights: interna-
tional arbitration.  
B. International Arbitration in Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, BITs generally allowed private investors to 
submit their disputes to international arbitration.46  Today, almost all BITs provide 
private parties the right to arbitrate claims against sovereigns.47  The United Na-
tions Commission of International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) often serves as the 
 ___________________________  
 37. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 178. 
 38. Id.; see also Vandevelde, supra note 27, at 637-38. 
 39. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 177.   
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. During this time, developing countries were pursuing two separate but competing economic 
ideologies.  First, developing countries in Latin America and Africa pursued import substitution, 
attempting to produce all goods and resources that they would otherwise have to import. See id. at 178-
79.  Essentially, import substitution countries attempted to create economic self-reliance, in hopes of 
establishing independence from international trade.  In contrast, developing countries in Asia pursued a 
more liberalized growth strategy, which emphasized more, not less, reliance on foreign trade.  Id. at 
177.  The goals of both ideologies were the same—expand and industrialize—but the means pursued 
were different.  The results supported that a more liberalized policy towards foreign investments was 
superior to the import substitution method.  Id. at 177-79.  For example, from 1965 to 1990, the econ-
omies of eight Asian countries, which had liberalized towards foreign investments, grew at three times 
the rate of Latin America countries and twenty-five times the rate of African countries.  Id. at 177.  
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet bloc further discredited the more conservative import substitu-
tion method.  Id. 
 43. Id. at 177-78. The private lending drought was largely caused by the massive expenditures 
incurred by the Reagan administration, which required extensive borrowing by the U.S. government 
during this time.  With less supply of money available, borrowers became more desperate for loans, 
while lenders could be pickier who received the loans.  The result is that many countries felt compelled 
to sign BITs, as a means of assuring cautious lenders that the debts would be honored.  Id. 
 44. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 503.  
 45. Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 179. 
 46. Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability 
of International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 725, 733 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 733-34; see also Franck, supra note 4, at 1538. 
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legal and procedural framework,48 and corresponding enforcement proceedings 
often occur in the U.S. and England.49  
Arguably, the right to arbitrate may represent the “most significant right” 
provided by BITs.50  Whenever conflict arises between two countries, political 
implications attach.  Prior to the existence of BIT arbitration, private parties could 
only effectuate enforcement against a sovereign through state action; private par-
ties could only bring claims against foreign states through their domestic govern-
ments via espousal.51  As a consequence, the U.S. often ignored enforcement of 
private investor rights abroad for concerns of creating political discord with trad-
ing partners.52  However, by insisting on an international forum and private deci-
sion makers, BITs extinguished political considerations from the resolution pro-
cess.53  As a result, BIT arbitration insures enforcement of private rights, when 
such enforcement would not otherwise be provided.54  However, as the following 
case will demonstrate, adoption of this enforcement mechanism has created some 
unforeseen consequences for developing countries. 
III. CHEVRON V. REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR 
On February 14, 2011, the culmination of eighteen years of litigation resulted 
in an $8.6 billion judgment in an Ecuadorian trial court in favor of the citizens of 
Ecuador.55  When local environmentalist Donald Moncayo heard that the court in 
Lago Agrio held Chevron Corporation liable for decades of petroleum contamina-
tion of the Amazon rainforest, Moncayo nearly cried.56  Emotionally he asked, 
“You mean we won?”57  Well, Mr. Moncayo, not exactly.   Barely a month later, 
March 17, the Second Circuit decided Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador and 
rendered the $8.6 billion judgment effectively null and void.58 
In 1993, citizens of Ecuador filed a claim in the Southern District of New 
York against Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum (collectively known as 
“Chevron”) for causing environmental damage to the Ecuadorian rainforests.59  
Although the Ecuadorian government (Ecuador) was not a party in this action, 
both Ecuador and Chevron opposed trying the case in the United States.60  Be-
 ___________________________  
 48. Rebecca Golbert, The Global Dimensions of the Current Economic Crisis and the Benefits of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 11 NEV. L.J. 502, 506 (2011). 
 49. Alexis Blane, Sovereign Immunity as a Bar to the Execution of International Arbitral Awards, 
41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 453, 456 (2009).  The United States and England provide common sites 
for enforcement of international arbitration decisions due to “their position[s] as financial leaders and 
repositories of capital.”  Id. 
 50. Ryan, supra note 46, at 733. 
 51. Id. at 733-34. The government could espouse a private claim through either diplomatic negotia-
tions or a formal suit with the International Court of Justice. 
 52. Id. at 734. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 391 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 56. Tim Padgett & Stephan Kuffner, Chevron v. Ecuador: Will the Plaintiffs Get Paid?, TIME 
MAGAZINE (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053075,00.html.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Chevron, 638 F.3d at 388. 
 59. Id. at 388-89.  
 60. Id. at 389. 
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cause Chevron satisfied the district court with a promise to submit itself to the 
jurisdiction of Ecuadorian courts, the Citizens of Ecuador re-filed their claim in 
Lago Agrio, Ecuador.61 
In September 2009, Chevron initiated arbitration proceedings against Ecuador 
in the Southern District of New York by invoking the arbitration clause within 
Ecuador’s Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).62  Chevron sought a BIT arbitral 
decision compelling Ecuador to intervene in the Lago Agrio litigation to clear 
Chevron of all liability.63  In December 2009, Ecuador responded by petitioning 
for a stay of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).64  Shortly after, 
the Ecuadorian citizens followed Ecuador’s lead, arguing arbitration should be 
stayed “to the extent it would seek dismissal, nullification, or avoidance of any 
judgment in the Lago Agrio litigation.”65  However, the Southern District of New 
York refused to stay arbitration, permitting the BIT arbitration and Lago Agrio 
litigation to proceed concurrently.66  On appeal, the Second Circuit, in Chevron, 
addressed whether the Southern District of New York correctly refused Ecuador’s 
request to stay arbitration.67 
After this case was briefed, but before the Second Circuit had issued this de-
cision, two notable yet conflicting events occurred.68  First, while the citizens of 
Ecuador initially sought damages of $27.3 billion, the Lago Agrio litigation re-
sulted in an $8.6 billion judgment against Chevron, a decision both parties intend-
ed to appeal.69  Second, the arbitration panel issued an interim order directing 
Ecuador “to take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended 
the enforcement . . . of a judgment against Chevron Corporation in the Lago Agrio 
case.”70  Considering these events, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
refusal to stay arbitration, upholding BIT arbitration and invalidating the $8.6 
billion rendered in the Ecuadorian trial court.71  In addition, Chevron raised two 
additional issues traditionally used to criticize BIT arbitration: inconsistency and 
interference with sovereign authority. 
IV. CRITICISMS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
A. Inconsistent Results 
While BIT agreements have stabilized the foreign investment landscape, arbi-
tration decisions issued under BIT agreements have undermined the consistent 
 ___________________________  
 61. Id. at 389-90. 
 62. Id. at 390. 
 63. Id. Chevron sought an arbitral decision regarding two issues.  First, Chevron argued that Ecuador 
had improperly interfered with the Lago Agrio litigation, a litigation Ecuador was not a party to. Sec-
ond, Chevron asserted that a prior settlement agreement existed with the Ecuadorian government to 
release Chevron from all environmental liability in the Lago Agrio litigation.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 390. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 391. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 401. 
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application of investment regulation.72  Inconsistent decisions issued by BIT arbi-
tration panels have counteracted the general stabilization effect BITs sought to 
achieve.73   These decisions adversely affect both investors and developing sover-
eigns.74  Investors structure their investments to take advantage of BIT arbitration 
provisions, but when arbitration fails to protect investors as generally expected, 
investor confidence can plummet.75  On the other hand, Professor Franck reports 
that governments can “find themselves in an untenable position of explaining to 
taxpayers why they are subject to damage awards for hundreds of millions of U.S. 
dollars in one case but not another.”76  According to Professor Annie Leeks, “[t]he 
lack of consistency in the arbitral process has come under attack from a number of 
commentators, with some claiming that the inconsistency has become so serious 
that it amounts to a crisis in the international investment dispute resolution sys-
tem.”77  For an extreme illustration of an arbitral decision generally inconsistent 
with other decisions rendered, consider Tecnicas Medioambentales Tecmed, S.A. 
v. United Mexican States.78 
In Tecmed, the Mexican government denied a company’s request to renew a 
license to operate a hazardous landfill.79  The International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) panel overseeing the decision held that the Mexi-
can government’s refusal violated its obligation to treat the company “fairly and 
equitably.”80  The tribunal’s rationale proved troubling to commentators.  Specifi-
cally, to determine whether a government treated an investor “fairly and equita-
bly,” the panel looked to investor expectations.81  The panel held that fair and 
equitable treatment requires that government action “does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the in-
vestment.”82  Perhaps more problematic, investors must “know beforehand any 
and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments.”83  While Tecmed 
stands for an expansive viewpoint of what constitutes fair and equitable treatment, 
scholars have extrapolated two conflicting implications from the Tecmed deci-
sion.84  
First, as stated by one international arbitrator, “[u]nder a strict reading of the 
Tecmed rule, governments would be obligated to consult with foreign investors in 
 ___________________________  
 72. Franck, supra note 4, at 1558. While normally cheaper than litigation, recent transactions costs 
of international arbitration have risen to match litigation. Golbert, supra note 48, at 507. The increased 
complexity of international arbitration compels this result. Id. Similar to litigation, international arbi-
tration may require “extensive discovery, production and translation of documents, and [use of] expert 
witnesses.  Id. The rationales of efficiency and speed may only apply to international arbitration in an 
illusionary sense. Id. 
 73. Franck, supra note 4, at 1558-59. 
 74. Id. at 1558. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Annie Leeks, The Relationship Between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Wider 
Corpus of International Law: The ICSID Approach, 65 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 1, 34 (2007). 
 78. Ryan, supra note 46, at 738-39. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 738. 
 81. Id. at 739. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 739-40. 
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advance to taking any regulatory action.”85  Mere notice of regulation, then, would 
not absolve a government from liability.86  Second, which and how many inves-
tors would Tecmed require the government to consult with?  Although never ex-
plicitly stated in Tecmed, some feel that the panel’s decision could be construed to 
require consultation with every foreign investo—a task simply impossible to do.87  
Consider the perverse role reversal.  While investor expectations ordinarily mate-
rialize considering the regulatory body already in place, the Tecmed panel man-
dated that governments conform their regulations to investor expectations.  Such a 
puzzling result has led “[c]ritics of the current system of international investment 
law [to] argue that the Tecmed ‘rule’ and other broad standards established by 
tribunals make it difficult for governments to govern.”88  This comment will fur-
ther discuss sovereign limitations in the following section, but Tecmed also repre-
sents the inconsistent adjudication of issues in international arbitration, creating 
unsettled precedent and investor confusion.   
B. Interference with Sovereign Authority 
An international arbitrator noted that BITs can “constrain the extent to which 
governments can govern.”89  Critics agree that permitting private parties to bring 
suits against national sovereigns exerts “an undue influence over the domestic 
conduct of a sovereign in ways that are detrimental either to the sovereign or to 
the people . . . .”90  This potential for undue influence exists not only within actual 
arbitration sanctions; the mere threat of arbitral proceedings grants private inves-
tors with power to shape a state’s regulatory processes and policies.91   
Representative of this, BITs create a “two-tiered system—one that provides 
greater property rights to foreign investors than it does to domestic investors.”92   
For example, if a domestic investor and a foreign investor start identical enterpris-
es and have identical causes of action against a state, the foreign investor can pre-
vail while the domestic investor fails.93  Although national laws of a host nation 
constrain the domestic investor, the foreign investor can apply international laws 
in BIT arbitration.94  As a result, a government may still be held liable even when 
its actions are “wholly consistent with domestic laws, serve the broad interests of 
the country, are in good faith, and are implemented in a non-discriminatory man-
ner.”95  Sovereigns, by entering into BITs, face heightened scrutiny for actions 
taken against foreign investors, which places pressure on developing nations to 
shape policies in conformity with Western expectations. 
Chevron signifies an example of a judicial application of BIT arbitration in-
fringing on the policies of a national sovereignty.  Specifically, commentators 
 ___________________________  
 85. Id. at 740. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 740-41. 
 88. Id. at 740. 
 89. Id. at 738. 
 90. Blane, supra note 49, at 488 (citing Ryan, supra note 46, at 738-39). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Ryan, supra note 46, at 737. 
 93. Id. at 738. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 739-40. 
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have viewed the development of the Lago Agrio litigation as representative of 
policy extended forth by the Ecuadorian government.96   Although a court-
appointed expert recommended damages of $27.3 billion, the Lago Agrio trial 
court issued a judgment for a mere $8.6 billion.97  A professor following this case, 
Georgene Vairo, stated, “[t]his is way low compared with what everyone was 
expecting to happen . . . . [Ecuador is] trying to show the world that [its citizens] 
are reasonable people.  This is Ecuador coming to the table.”98   
Indeed, many interpreted the Lago Agrio decision as willingness from both 
sides to compromise.  According to a Time Magazine article, because the Lago 
Agrio trial court awarded only $9 billion of the $27 billion that the plaintiffs 
sought, “many are starting to ask an obvious question: Isn’t it time for both sides 
to think again about settling this thing out of court?”99  After the Lago Agrio deci-
sion, the atmosphere appeared ripe for settlement—a position, according to aca-
demics, adopted by the Ecuadorian government.100  However, the Second Circuit, 
in Chevron, essentially killed any possibility of settlement.  As a result, the Sec-
ond Circuit’s decision has interfered with the national policy that the Ecuadorian 
government intended to pursue and represents a judicial affirmation of BITs inter-
ference with governance of foreign jurisdictions.  
By allowing the BIT arbitration to proceed, the Second Circuit has disrupted 
any realistic possibility of settlement.  The relative positions of the parties have 
dramatically shifted.  Chevron, with an order from a BIT arbitration panel absolv-
ing them of all liability, has little incentive to settle with Ecuador following the 
Second Circuit’s decision.  The arbitral panel suspended all judgments issued by 
the Lago Agrio court, voiding the $8 billion judgment, which many felt was quite 
reasonable.  By stripping away Ecuadorian authority to hold Chevron liable, the 
Second Circuit has annihilated any remaining leverage that the sovereignty pos-
sessed.   And as Judge Lewis Kaplan, who presided over the case, stated, “nobody 
here was born yesterday, cases are settled because of leverage.”101   
Perhaps Ecuador still maintains a degree of leverage looking forward to the 
subsequent arbitration enforcement proceeding that the Second Circuit mentioned 
in Chevron.  The Second Circuit correctly stated that if Ecuadorian courts reach 
final judgment in favor of the Ecuadorian citizens and the arbitral panel reaches a 
final judgment in favor of Chevron, citizens of Ecuador may challenge the panel’s 
decision in the subsequent enforcement proceeding at the district court.102  How-
ever, in reality, Ecuadorian citizens have little chance of prevailing in such a hear-
ing.  The Southern District of New York has provided all initial decisions regard-
ing this case, and Chevron will likely seek to enforce the arbitral decision in that 
court.  On March 17, 2011, the same day the Second Circuit issued Chevron, the 
 ___________________________  
 96. Gonzalo Solano & Frank Bajak, Chevron Fined $8.6 Billion in Ecuador, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LCT1G00.htm. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Padgett & Kuffner, supra note 56. 
 100. Solano & Bajak, supra note 96. 
 101. Mark Hamblett, Federal Judge Blocks Enforcement of Likely Judgment Against Chevron, NEW 
YORK LAW JOURNAL (Feb.  9, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id 
=1202480876078&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.  Judge Kaplan issued a temporary restraining order against 
the Ecuadorian plaintiffs from enforcing the Lago Agrio award outside of Ecuador.  Id. 
 102. Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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Southern District of New York issued a decision tantamount to the enforcement of 
the arbitral decision.103   
The Southern District of New York ordered a preliminary injunction, prevent-
ing enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment outside of Ecuador.104 From this 
ruling, one can extrapolate that the Southern District has already passed judgment 
regarding Chevron’s liability.  Asking the district court to affirm again its decision 
in the enforcement proceeding will prove little difficulty for Chevron.   What does 
the Second Circuit expect the district court to do, completely change its mind in 
less than a year’s time?  To be fair, allegations have arisen throughout the litiga-
tion that Ecuador exercised coercive practices to compel Chevron into early set-
tlement.105  However, the Lago Agrio judgment—which issued damages far below 
expectations—hardly fits within this category of wrongful conduct.  As empha-
sized by Professor Vairo, this reduced award declared by the Lago Agrio court 
represented Ecuador’s attempt to convince the international community that they 
were acting reasonably and in good faith.106    
Despite Ecuador’s reasonableness and indication of a pro-settlement policy, 
the Second Circuit has permitted international BIT arbitration to disrupt the gov-
ernance of a national government. Ironically, Chevron represents a judicial utiliza-
tion of dispute resolution—BIT arbitration—to prevent parties from resolving 
their disagreement through dispute resolution via negotiation and settlement.  That 
such utilization prevents a national sovereign from effectively pursuing the poli-
cies of the state presents an example of the prime evil that BITs may create. 
In addition, Chevron also contributes to what Professor Barnali Choudhury 
characterizes as a “democratic deficit.”107  Interference with a state’s public policy 
necessarily implicates the democratic process.108  Elected officials, chosen to pro-
tect the welfare of a populace, dictate a country’s public policy, and any disturb-
ance of public policy naturally challenges the legislature’s policy making authori-
ty.109  Substitution of international policy over domestic policy excludes input of 
local legislatures and courts, rendering citizen participation in the Democratic 
process more remote.110  As a result, Chevron’s effect of diminishing Ecuador’s 
sovereign authority indirectly weakens the democratic legitimacy of Ecuador’s 
political system. 
The critique that BITs interfere with sovereign control is far from novel.  In-
deed, many feel that sovereigns take this limitation of authority into consideration, 
as representative of the “grand bargain” made when entering into BIT agree-
ments.111  However, “bargain” connotes a tradeoff.  If indeed third-world coun-
tries have traded away some sovereign authority, the obvious question is: what 
have these countries received?  By sacrificing their sovereign authority, did devel-
 ___________________________  
 103. Id. at 399 n.11.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 396. 
 106. Solano & Bajak, supra note 96. 
 107. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the 
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 784-85 
(2008). 
 108. Id. at 778-79, 782. 
 109. Id at 782. 
 110. Id. at 784. 
 111. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text. 
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oping countries realize the intended benefits from their bargain?  And if not, do 
BITs represent a truly reciprocal contract?   
V. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES’ INTENDED BENEFITS TO 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Non-developed countries theoretically receive three benefits by signing BITs: 
improved rule of law, relationship building, and increased foreign investment.112  
However, disagreement exists as to the validity of these purported benefits, which 
the following section discusses.  The first two paragraphs of each section will 
discuss the debatable benefits BITs provide to developing countries, and the re-
mainder of each section will discuss Chevron as an example where judicial appli-
cation rendered these benefits meaningless.  As this section demonstrates, benefits 
provided by BIT arbitration do not toll automatically, but rather depend on appli-
cation by the courts.  Unfair application, as was the case in Chevron, may contrib-
ute to the current “crisis in legitimacy” facing international arbitration.   
A. Strengthening Legal Institutions and the Rule of Law 
Some theorists argue that BIT arbitration helps improve the rules of law with-
in a developing country.113  Developing countries, by signing BITs, implicitly 
state that deficiencies in their government institutions and/or judicial systems 
impair their ability to enforce their rules of law.114  BITs fill this void by replacing 
domestic institutions with international institutions and national standards of law 
with international standards.115  By preventing government authorities from acting 
arbitrarily or abusively towards foreign investors, BITs induce these administra-
tors to treat their nationals in similar fashion.116  Because BIT arbitration proceed-
ings allegedly provide examples for developing countries to follow, in hopes that 
these countries can reform their own inadequate regulatory institutions, advocates 
for international arbitration assert that developing countries will adopt a height-
ened respect for fair governance and consistent rules of law.117   
On the other hand, some commentators feel that BIT arbitration, as an inter-
national role model, may in fact impede sovereigns seeking to strengthen their 
rules of law and legal institutions.118  Professor Tom Ginsburg argues that the 
effect of BITs strengthening legal institutions is unclear, and in some cases BITs 
 ___________________________  
 112. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L. J. 427, 
441-42, 444 (2010). 
 113. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of 
Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 337, 365 (2007). 
 114. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 444. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Franck, supra note 113, at 365  (“[C]ommentators suggest that the existence of international 
dispute resolution for foreign investment inhibits the development of the rule of law in national courts 
by creating a regime that provides a privilege to foreign investors and removes investment disputes 
from local courts.”). 
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may actually impair the strength of law within a developing country.119   Professor 
Ron Daniels agrees and “suggests that investment treaties have subverted the evo-
lution of robust rule of law institutions in the development world.”120  Professor 
Daniels goes further to suggest “that BITs enfeeble host state governments and, in 
sharp contrast to the claims made by supporters of BIT, will end up discrediting 
the normative legitimacy of the BIT as a rule of law demonstration project.”121  In 
sum, these commentators feel that only internal impetuses for change can lead to 
meaningful institutional improvement, and no external force, no matter how no-
ble, can compel the strengthened rule of law.122 
In Chevron, the Second Circuit weakened the strength of law in Ecuador, 
countering an intended benefit BITs purportedly provide to developing nations.  
By upholding the arbitral decision in Chevron while preventing final adjudication 
in the Ecuadorian court system, the Second Circuit has diminished, not promoted, 
the rule of law in Ecuador.  While the Lago Agrio litigation decided whether 
Chevron was liable for damaging Ecuadorian rainforests, the BIT arbitration de-
cided whether the Ecuadorian government and court system acted fairly and legit-
imately throughout the Lago Agrio litigation.123  Essentially, the BIT panel was 
asked to pass judgment on the state of the rules of law and legal institutions pres-
ently in place in Ecuador.  Of course, the panel’s judgment was not favorable.124  
In addition, the confidentiality of BIT arbitration prevents Ecuador from learning 
the details or rationales of the panel’s decision.125  Without knowing the reasoning 
behind the panel’s decision, Ecuador lacks the necessary information in order to 
improve its legal institutions.   
The BIT panel essentially sent a message to the international community—
which the Second Circuit affirmed with its refusal the stay arbitration—that Ecua-
dor’s rules of law and court system were inadequate to protect foreign invest-
ments.  The Second Circuit has indirectly diminished the prestige of Ecuadorian 
courts and rules of law in the eyes of the international community.  Judicial affir-
mation that Ecuador is too underdeveloped to handle major lawsuits may frustrate 
or demoralize attempts by Ecuadorian institutions to improve.  Perhaps confirm-
ing Professor Ginsburg fears, Chevron may represent a “circumstance[] [where] 
BITs may lead to lower institutional quality in subsequent years.”126   
Recall that improvements to a country’s rules of laws require “evolution,”127 
which connotes that time and opportunity must be provided to sovereigns for such 
growth to occur.  After all, the argument that BITs improve rules of laws within 
developing countries relies on developing countries making such improvements 
 ___________________________  
 119. Id. at 366; Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 107, 119 (2005) (“[T]he decision to bypass 
domestic courts may reduce courts’ incentives to improve performance by depriving key actors from a 
need to invest in institutional improvement.”).  
 120. Franck, supra note 113, at 366 (“[F]oreign investors rationally refrain from championing good 
and generalized law reforms in the developing state, preferring instead to protect their interests by 
relying on the BIT rule of law enclave.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 444.  See also Frank, supra note 113, at 336.  
 123. Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Leeks, supra note 77, at 34. 
 126. Ginsburg, supra note 119, at 122. 
 127. Franck, supra note 113, at 366.  
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themselves.  Otherwise, as stated by Professor Daniels, BIT arbitration is simply 
“enfeebling” state governments from improving.128  Furthermore, the Second 
Circuit’s refusal to provide such time and opportunity comes at a detriment to 
Ecuador, beyond the scope of simply discrediting Ecuadorian courts.   
B. Improving Trade Relations 
Proponents of international arbitration argue that trade relations between 
countries improve with passages of BITs.129  BITs can liberalize emerging mar-
kets by convincing less-developed countries to view private capital more favora-
bly.130  In the process, more private access reduces barriers to entry, removes 
regulatory impediments, and fosters the continued operation of private capital.131  
Because BITs liberalize the economic philosophies of developing countries closer 
to the economic edicts exercised by developed countries, BITs can strengthen 
relations between signatory countries.132  Improved relations can assist developing 
countries in obtaining favors from developed countries.133  These favors can in-
clude increased trade, foreign aid, security assistance, technological transfers, and 
other intangible benefits.134   
Furthermore, with transitions of power in developing countries so common-
place, new regimes can establish rapport and trust with industrialized neighbors by 
entering into BITs.  For example, in 2005, a leftist party seized power in Uru-
guay.135  By ratifying a BIT agreement with the U.S., the newly minted govern-
ment gained immediate international legitimacy and preserved its export markets 
in the U.S.136 
In Chevron, the Second Circuit’s decision impairs the trade relationship be-
tween the United States and Ecuador, counter to an intended benefit BITs purport-
edly provide to developing nations.  While the existence of BIT agreements gen-
erally serves to strengthen relationships between countries, the Chevron decision 
will likely—if it has not already—impair relations between the U.S. and Ecuador.   
Common sense and recent developments support this position.  
Intuitively, the next question is how the Ecuadorian government is supposed 
to react after the Second Circuit’s decision.  The Second Circuit’s decision in 
Chevron renders nearly a decade of litigation in Ecuador’s own courts meaning-
less.  A foreign tribunal adjudicates its domestic legal process as defunct to the 
entire world.  A multi-billion dollar judgment is ripped from its hands, and a for-
eign multi-national—after ravaging perhaps the country’s greatest natural re-
source—walks away without paying Ecuadorian citizens a dime.   All of this, 
arguably, the Ecuadorian government can blame on the ratification of the BIT 
 ___________________________  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 352.  
 130. Id. at 361-62. 
 131. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 443-44. 
 132. Id. at 443. 
 133. Id. at 442. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.  
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agreement with the United States.  Common sense compels the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment to feel quite jaded with the BIT regime, and who can blame them?   
Evidence exists that Ecuador has backlashed against the international invest-
ment regime.137  In 2010, after Chevron initiated BIT arbitration in late 2009, 
Ecuador formally withdrew from the International Center for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID), an entity commonly conducting BIT arbitration.138  
Furthermore, recently Ecuador unilaterally withdrew from nine BIT agreements 
and intends to renegotiate the rest, including the agreement with the U.S.139  In 
fact, Ecuador has recently incorporated a specific provision banning BIT arbitra-
tion into its constitution.140  Of particular importance, Article 422 of Ecuador’s 
constitution mandates that Ecuador must not enter “international treaties in which 
Ecuador gives sovereign jurisdiction to international arbitration for certain contro-
versies between the State and private natural or juridical persons.”141  While no 
one has asserted that the Chevron case exclusively and directly caused this shift in 
policy, mere coincidence appears unlikely as well, especially considering the tem-
poral proximity between these events.  At the very least, the Second Circuit’s 
decision contributed to Ecuador adopting this anti-BIT policy.  If trade treaties 
strengthen relations between signatory countries and the Second Circuit’s decision 
contributed to Ecuador’s newfound opposition to such treaties, Chevron’s applica-
tion of the BIT has weakened—not strengthened—relations between the U.S. and 
Ecuador.  Having diminished Ecuador’s rules of law and trade relations with the 
U.S., Chevron negates any effect of additional capital that the BIT potentially 
could have provided. 
C. Increasing Direct Foreign Investment 
Generally, investors make investment decisions based on two main considera-
tions: expected return and risk.  BITs, by providing clear and enforceable interna-
tional rules, reduce foreign investment risk.142   Because BITs reduce investment 
risk, proponents argue that the existence of a BIT compels institutional investors 
to invest more than had a BIT agreement not existed.143  Thus, developing coun-
tries theoretically should receive more foreign contributions by signing BIT 
agreements.144  While these contributions usually manifest in tangible forms, such 
as financing and development of road construction, energy production, or in-
creased telecommunications capacity, investment can take on broader, less tangi-
 ___________________________  
 137. See United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, supra note 1, at 6; Salacuse, supra 
note 112, at 469-70. 
 138. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 469. 
 139. See United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, supra note 1, at 6; see also  Ecua-
dor’s Plans to Terminate All Bilateral Investment Treaties, WIKILEAKS (Oct. 27, 2009),  available at 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09QUITO905.  
 140. United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, supra note 1, at 6 n.9. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 35, at 77. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.; see also Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Resolutions 
Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 168-69, 171 (2007) (noting that developing countries sign 
BITs despite “mixed empirical evidence as to [BITs’] actual success in securing foreign investment”). 
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ble forms like intellectual property rights.145  Additional capital streaming into a 
developing economy stimulates economic growth and reduces global poverty.146  
BITs’ effect of risk reduction does not operate as a short-sighted benefit.147  Ra-
ther, some argue that BITs permanently reduce political risk by improving the rule 
of law within a developing country.148 
However, several studies have questioned the BIT regime’s ability to generate 
any additional foreign investment in practice.149  Professor Salacuse pointed out 
that even the World Bank has publicly questioned whether BITs in fact increase 
direct foreign investments in a signatory country.150  Furthermore, the relationship 
between BITs and economic prosperity appears even more attenuated.151   
While the Second Circuit’s application of the BIT agreement between the 
U.S. and Ecuador has surely assisted Chevron in securing themselves against lia-
bility in Ecuador, Chevron will likely not increase foreign investments in Ecuador.   
Admittedly, this comment cannot prove empirically that Ecuador received no 
increase in foreign investments after signing its BIT agreement with the United 
States.  However, even assuming arguendo that the BIT agreement did promote 
foreign investment in Ecuador, the Second Circuit’s application of the BIT agree-
ment could not have increased foreign investments.  If BITs do in fact promote 
foreign investment, revocation of a BIT agreement would necessarily diminish 
foreign investments.  Yet, as previously discussed, the Second Circuit’s decision, 
at the very least, has contributed to Ecuador’s disavowal of BITs and therefore, 
prevented any prospective investments Ecuador would have received.   
Furthermore, certain implications from Chevron may actually impair foreign 
investments in Ecuador.  The Second Circuit, by refusing to stay arbitration, per-
mitted the BIT panel to send a clear message to international investors that Ecua-
dor lacks the legal infrastructure and strength of law to protect foreign invest-
ments.  Because of the Second Circuit’s decision, all investors know that any in-
vestments made in Ecuador entail a high political risk, and “empirical evidence . . 
. suggests that without other favorable conditions such as political stability, BITs 
do not significantly affect investment flows.”152   
In summary, the Second Circuit’s application of the BIT arbitration provision 
in Chevron impeded the intended benefits Ecuador sought from ratifying its BIT.  
To pursue these benefits, Ecuador implicitly surrendered a degree of sovereign 
control, as part of BIT’s “grand bargain.”  However, because Ecuador sacrificed 
sovereignty but gained none of the purported benefits of its BIT agreement, the 
Second Circuit, in Chevron, rendered the BIT agreement between the U.S. and 
Ecuador an unequal bargain in favor of the developed country.  This unequal dis-
 ___________________________  
 145. Franck, supra note 144, at 168-69. 
 146. Patricia M. Robin, The BIT Won’t Bite: The American Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 33 
AM. U. L. REV. 931, 935 (1984); Franck, supra note 144, at 168-69. 
 147. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 443-44. 
 148. Id. at 444. 
 149. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 468; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 35, at 67-75; see, e.g., Mary 
Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit ... and They Could Bite 
(2003), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/3121.pdf?expires=1346986831&id=id& 
accname=guest&checksum=360D4489E3D402F9ADE6AA450C25A587. 
 150. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 468-69. 
 151. Id. at 469. 
 152. Leeks, supra note 77, at 38. 
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tribution of rights contributes to what many commentators characterize as an in-
ternational investment crisis. As the following section indicates, in order to pre-
serve the current BIT arbitration system, considerations of fairness should factor 
into criteria for the resolution of such claims. 
VI. UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 
While BITs purportedly advance both developed and non-developed coun-
tries, concern already exists that the benefits BITs provide remain unbalanced.153  
Most BIT agreements in place today are drafted in favor of developed countries, 
and, therefore, developed countries receive the majority of the benefits.154  This 
uneven distribution of rights reflects the patently unequal bargaining positions 
between the parties, especially considering the historical necessity and competi-
tive forces compelling developing countries to enter into BITs.155  The very fact 
that the vast majority of investment treaties are negotiated in a bilateral, not multi-
lateral, setting reflects attempts by developed countries to magnify their bargain-
ing position.156  In lieu of the unequal bargaining positions between the parties, the 
prior justifications for developing countries to enter into BITs, part of a supposed 
“grand bargain,” may no longer apply.  As Professor Salacuse points out, if signa-
tory developing countries do not believe that BITs fulfill the “fundamental objec-
tive of promoting investment and ultimately economic prosperity, then the justifi-
cation for its continued existence becomes problematic.”157 
A. Grand Bargain Far from Grand 
Many scholars have labeled BITs as a “grand bargain.”158  Between devel-
oped and developing countries, the “grand bargain” represents a promise of in-
vestment security in exchange for the promise of future investments.159  However, 
 ___________________________  
 153. Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade & Investment: Foreign Direct Investment 
Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18. N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 57 (2005). 
 154. Id. at 20. 
 155. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 503-04.   
 
[T]he diffusion of BITs is associated with competitive pressures among developing countries to 
capture a limited pool of assets available for foreign investment.  The proliferation of BITs is 
propelled by this competition for capital . . . . This confluence of factors leaves developing coun-
tries with little real choice but to sign the charter of a new era. 
 
Id. See also Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 153, at 26-27 (“The pressure to gain the financial 
investment of the more developed nation will often lead a host country to give up concessions that in 
the long run may not be in the best interests of the country’s environment, resources, or population.”). 
 156. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 35, at 78. 
 157. Salacuse, supra note 112, at 469. 
 158. Paul M. Blyschak, State Consent, Investor Interests and the Future of Investment Arbitration: 
Reanalyzing the Jurisdiction of Investor-State Tribunals in Hard Cases, 9 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & 
TRADE L. 99, 115 (2009); see also Kevin P. Gallagher & Melissa B.L. Birch, Do Investment Agree-
ment Attract Investment?, 7 J. OF WORLD TRADE & INVESTMENT 961 (2006). 
 159. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 35, at 77. 
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the “grand bargain” can also represent an internal tradeoff.160   Developing sover-
eigns trade away domestic authority for hopes of additional foreign investment.161   
At the cost of losing sovereignty without receiving benefits, BIT agreements 
may signify an asymmetrical distribution of contractual rights.  For example, in 
Chevron, while BIT arbitration infringed on Ecuadorian authority by preventing 
settlement, BIT arbitration did not improve Ecuador’s rules of law, trade relations 
with the U.S, or the amount of foreign investment flowing into the sovereign.  As 
consideration involved in BITs loses its mutuality, contracting parties may wish to 
withdraw from such agreements.  As more and more host nations realize that BITs 
do not deliver on their promises, developing countries have begun to backlash 
against the BIT regime and investment arbitration, particularly in Latin Ameri-
ca.162  Left unchecked, “there is no reason to assume that this tangible dissatisfac-
tion with the BIT regime will remain limited to Latin America.”163  This dissatis-
faction with the “grand bargain” made has led some commentators to conclude 
that investment arbitration, and the BIT regime overall, currently faces a “crisis of 
legitimacy.”164  By shedding much of the international regime previously adopted, 
Latin America appears to embody this crisis, and decisions like Chevron only 
exacerbate the problem.   
B. A More Just Result? 
To be clear, this comment does not assert that the Second Circuit should have 
stayed arbitration because the court issued a legally incorrect decision.  Rather, 
considering the unequal bargaining positions and distribution of contractual rights 
within Ecuador’s BIT, as well as the general dissatisfaction with the BIT mecha-
nism overall, this comment takes the position that the Second Circuit should have 
stayed arbitration to make the BIT agreement more equitable.  In light of the mass 
disavowals of BITs by Latin American countries, had the Second Circuit consid-
ered a more equitable approach, one that appreciates the disparate positions of the 
parties, the court could have taken a step toward combating the current crisis fac-
ing the BIT regime.   
Though it may appear extreme, this position has support in the academic 
community, with several commentators advocating for a balancing approach when 
considering the respective rights of investors and the sovereign in BIT arbitra-
tion.165  For example, one commentator suggests that while arbitral panels current-
ly view their duty as belonging to investors, panels should aim for neutrality “to 
balance the interests of investors and state parties in an objective and depoliticized 
 ___________________________  
 160. Kaushal, supra note 1, at 510. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Blyschak, supra note 158, at 121-23; see also United Nations Conference on Trade & Develop-
ment, supra note 1, at 6.   
 163. Blyschak, supra note 158, at 123. 
 164. Franck, supra note 4, at 1584. 
 165. See, e.g., Leeks, supra note 77, at 38-39;  PHILLIPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND 
THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES (2005); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICTS OF NORMS IN 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2009); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 
AM. J. INT’L  L. 535 (2001); Blyschak, supra note 158, at 134-35. 
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manner.”166  Professor Benjamin Davis agrees, suggesting further that courts can 
utilize the New York Convention, incorporated into many BITs and the BIT in 
Chevron, to preserve a more “neutral” international arbitral process.167  Professor 
Davis is particularly concerned with international arbitration adversely affecting 
the rights of the “most vulnerable populations” in less developed countries.168 
By leaving the BIT panel’s decision undisturbed, the Second Circuit has pro-
vided no benefit to Ecuador.  With the arbitral decision in place, the best Ecuador 
can hope for is a favorable final judgment in Ecuadorian courts.  However, final 
judgment in Ecuador leaves undisturbed the Southern District of New York’s 
injunction, issued the same day as and specifically mentioned by Chevron, pre-
venting enforcement of the Lago Agrio litigation.  Plaintiffs cannot capture Chev-
ron’s assets to force the company to pay the $8.6 billion judgment anyway.  Fur-
thermore, and as mentioned in Part I, the Southern District of New York, by issu-
ing this injunction, is unlikely to deny enforcement of the arbitration decision in 
the subsequent enforcement proceeding. 
The Second Circuit’s decision perplexes considering the irrevocable effect on 
the parties.  Had the Second Circuit, in just this instance, stayed arbitration as 
Ecuador requested, both parties win.  Consider the following scenarios.  Perhaps 
the parties could have settled, in which case Ecuador’s pro-settlement policy 
comes to fruition and is undisturbed by judicial action.  Ecuadorian citizens re-
ceive a degree of compensation, but Chevron avoids potential liability nearing $30 
billion.  Any settlement Chevron would have to pay would likely not exceed the 
$8.6 billion judgment of the Lago Agrio decision.  Considering the Southern Dis-
trict of New York’s injunction preventing enforcement of the Lago Agrio judg-
ment, Ecuador would be hard pressed to ask for more.   
Or, as the Second Circuit expressly discussed, the Ecuadorian court system 
could have corrected itself through its appeals process.  In this scenario, Chevron, 
of course, is thrilled to be free of liability.  Ecuador’s rules of law, as well as the 
legitimacy of its court system, would be strengthened without foreign influence.  
International investors would feel confident to invest or continue to invest in Ec-
uador.  Under either scenario, Ecuador captures at least some of the intended ben-
efits of its BIT, making its agreement a little grander than the situation now.  With 
the Second Circuit’s decision, Ecuador will likely receive nothing. 
Perhaps a sense of unease could rest in holding Chevron partially liable if 
Chevron had absolutely no fault at all, but that is not the case.  Most environmen-
tal scientists agree that Chevron did not adequately clean its drilling operations.169  
The issue is not whether Chevron is liable, but rather how much liability they 
should incur.170  The Second Circuit could have allowed alternative dispute reso-
lution—settlement—before relying on a tool for dispute resolution mechanism—
BIT arbitration—to deprive Ecuadorian citizens of all remedies. 
 ___________________________  
 166. Blyschak, supra note 158, at 135. 
 167. Benjamin Davis, Occupy Arbitration Power and Review in Supreme Court Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Clauses and Awards 1-2 (Working Paper, 2011) (on file with author).  
 168. Id. 
 169. Padgett & Kuffner, supra note 56.  Recall that Texaco and Chevron merged after the citizens of 
Ecuador commenced this lawsuit.  See supra note 59.    
 170. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
While the cost is substantial, BITs remain contractual instruments.  Sustain-
ing cost without realizing utility, signatory countries have shifted their sentiments 
regarding BITs and foreign investment.  In recent years, a backlash has swept 
through Ecuador and its Latin America neighbors, and the flames of insurrection 
threaten the global investment landscape.  If the BIT framework is to persist, 
courts applying BIT treaties may need to balance the interests of investors and 
developing countries.  Only a more equal distribution of rights will persuade de-
veloping sovereigns that BITs remain a viable regulatory device.   
As Chevron demonstrates, Ecuador may freely contract away sovereignty for 
consideration of a strengthened rule of law, improved trade relations, and in-
creased foreign investment.   However, these benefits do not universally toll but 
rather depend on specific applications by the judiciary.  Chevron does not appear 
to provide these benefits as BITs generally intend.  At the very least, Chevron 
does not further these benefits.  The Second Circuit should have considered the 
consequential effects of its decision on both the country of Ecuador and the per-
ception of BITs.  Chevron highlights some of the primary dangers associated with 
BITs and helps to prove that BITs cannot achieve their full potential without even-
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